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ABSTRACT
The search neutrality debate, as a parallel to the network
neutrality debate, is raging worldwide, with search engines
accused of biasing the ranking of their organic links to pro-
vide a competitive advantage to their own content. In a
recent paper, we have designed a model and determined the
optimal ranking policy for a search engine as a trade-off
between short-term revenue (based on the potential imme-
diate gain from high-ranked links) and long-term revenue
(based on the satisfaction of users due to the relevance of
the ranking). We here apply this model to investigate on
an example whether non-neutrality impacts innovation. We
illustrate that a revenue-oriented search engine may indeed
deter innovation at the content level, hence the validity of
the argument (without necessarily meaning that search en-
gines should be regulated).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-
Communication Networks—Network Operations
General Terms
Economics, Neutrality, Search Engines, Vertical Integration,
Competition
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a debate about search
neutrality, relating it to the more well-known network neu-
trality debate which was more focusing on Internet service
providers [6]. Indeed, some search engines (SEs) have been
under scrutiny by individuals and organizations that over-
see the Internet, as well as by regulators in various coun-
tries, because some believe that the organic search ranking
is not based only on objective measures of relevance, but
also accounts for some revenue-making ingredients [2]. For
example, it has been said that Google may favor YouTube
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and other of its own content because of the extra revenue
it generates. It can be direct revenue due to sold products,
but more often indirect revenues from advertisements due to
visits to free web sites or applications. This bias in ranking
has been experimentally illustrated, see [4, 6, 9] where it is
shown for example that Microsoft (resp. Google) content
is 26 times (resp. 17 times) more likely to be displayed on
the first page of Bing (owned by Microsoft) (resp. Google)
than on any other search engine. Search neutrality has been
and is still discussed by governments and regulators, such
as in the US by the Federal Trade Commission [1] and in
a Senate hearing [8], or in Europe where Google is facing
a $6 billion fine. The question is whether or not a search
engine should or not base its ranking on relevance on links
only, and whether or not a non-neutral engine would harm
the Internet economy by reducing competition, or innova-
tion by favoring the incumbents that are known to gener-
ate profits. Such a behavior would prevent new applica-
tions/content from being shown, and hence from becoming
known and successful. The question relates to other policy
debates regarding whether and how to regulate the Internet,
the most prominent example being the already mentioned
network neutrality debate [7].
We have designed in [5] a model of a search engine cap-
turing the trade-off between long-term gains (due to large
numbers of visits) thanks to a ranking based on relevance
and short-term gains due to highly ranked own content. We
have characterized the (simple) optimal ranking policy for
a search engine and shown how to compute it. Our goal
in the present paper is to apply this optimal ranking in or-
der to answer the question of whether or not non-neutrality,
that is, a ranking not based on relevance only, hurts content
innovation and investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we briefly recall the main characteristics of the
model in [5] and the main results obtained on it. Section 3
then presents the specific model studying the impact of a
non-neutral engine on content innovation and investment,
assuming that the search engine implements the previously
described revenue-maximizing ranking policy.
2. MODEL:NON-NEUTRALANDNEUTRAL
SE RANKINGS
The search engine model and the corresponding results
(revenue-maximizing ranking policy) are described in full
detail in [5]; here we summarize them to develop further the
content innovation aspect.
Consider a search engine receiving requests. To a request
y corresponds a number m of pages to be displayed. We
denote by {1, . . . ,m} the set of corresponding pages, and
define for each page i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) the relevance ri of this
page for request y. A ranking is a choice of permutation
pi(y) = (pi(y, 1), . . . , pi(y,m)) for each request y. A “fair" or
“neutral" SE should rank the pages in decreasing order of
relevances.
A request can therefore be defined as y = (m, r1, . . . , rm).
But requests arriving randomly according to a given distri-
bution, we denote the random request as Y = (M,R1, . . . , RM )
with random corresponding number of pages and relevances:
y is a realization of Y .
Now assume that to each request, there is an associated
gain gi for the SE if link i is clicked, which can be due to a
direct sale or to indirect gains from advertisements on the
associated page for example. The click-through rate (CTR)
of link i if at position k is commonly assumed to be separable
into a position effect θk and a relevance effect ψ(ri), hence
a CTR θkψ(ri) (assuming θ1 > θ2 > · · · > θm), so that the
gain from being displayed at slot k is θkψ(ri)ri. A random
request is then extended to Y = (M,R1, G1, . . . , RM , GM ),
with those gain values. A revenue-oriented SE would be
tempted to sort links for any y according to the g˜i = ψ(ri)gi,
but this would not take into account the level of satisfaction
of users who are more likely to reuse the SE if the ranking
is relevant. A revenue-oriented SE actually would rather
prefer to rank for each request in order to maximize
λ(r)(g + β)
where
• β is the average gain per visit due to sponsored links,
that is how SEs are known to earn money
• r = E
[∑M
i=1 θpi(Y,i)ψ(Ri)Ri
]
is the average relevance
over all requests depending on the choices of permuta-
tions
• λ(r) is the average number of requests per unit of time
which is assumed to increasingly depend on the quality
(the average relevance) of the SE
• g = E
[∑M
i=1 θpi(Y,i)ψ(Ri)Gi
]
is the average gain from
organic links for the given ranking policy pi(Y, ·).
Remark that it encompasses the case of a “neutral” SE rank-
ing according to relevance by considering Gi = 0 ∀i: indeed
in that case the SE revenue is simply maximized by maxi-
mizing the average relevance r.
In [5], we have shown that, under conditions that we are
“hiding” here for space reasons, the optimal ranking policy
can be explicitly described. Denote by R˜i = ψ(Ri)Ri (resp.
G˜i = ψ(Ri)Gi) the relevance (resp. gain) from i weighed
by its relevance-effect click probability. The optimal policy
is simply, for any request Y , to rank links in a decreasing
order of R˜i + ρG˜i for some real ρ. Such a policy is called a
LO-ρ policy (Linear Ordering with weight ρ). It remarkably
simplifies the search for an optimal policy to just finding the
optimal parameter ρ, which can be done easily by simple
optimization techniques.
3. IMPACT OF NON NEUTRALITY ON IN-
NOVATION AND INVESTMENT
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the impact of a non-
neutral SE, that is, of an SE applying the above optimal pol-
icy, on other actors, namely users and content providers. We
especially aim at investigating whether or not a non-neutral
SE harms competition and innovation. The numerical anal-
ysis we perform can be easily replaced with any other input
data.
Consider that among the M pages corresponding to a
given request, one exactly (say, page number 1 for simplic-
ity) is served directly by the SE while the others are served
by third parties. We then have G2 = . . . = GM = 0. For our
numerical illustrations, let us assume that always ten pages
match a request (M = 10). In addition to the revenue com-
ing from Page 1, the SE also receives an expected revenue
of β = 1 per request from sponsored links. We furthermore
assume CTR(i) = θi as specified in Table 1, values obtained
from measurements in [3]. We also set λ(r) = r, and ψ
to be the unit function (i.e., only position affect the click-
through-rate). For i = 1, 3, 4, ..., 10, Ri and G1 are all con-
sidered independent random variables uniformly distributed
over [0, 1]. To consider the impact on innovation, we as-
sume that CP 2 invests in quality and manages to improve
its relevance distribution. More specifically, we assume that
when it invests to reach a quality z > 0, the relevance of CP
2 becomes uniformly distributed over [0, 1 + 20z] (instead
of over [0, 1]). We still assume independence between R2
and the other random variables (relevances and gain G1).
Additionally, since we want to consider the impact of a non-
neutral ranking on the revenue of other content providers,
we assume that they have too a gain uniformly distributed
[0, 1] and independent of the other random variables, how-
ever that gain is not to the SE so we still have Gi = 0, i ≥ 2.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show simulation results when the
SE ranks CPs according to R˜i + ρG˜i, for varying values of
ρ, and when z = 2. For a neutral ranking (ρ = 0), CP 2
logically makes more revenue than the other CPs, since it
regularly gets higher ranking. However, when ρ increases
and exceeds about 0.8, CP 1 becomes the one with highest
revenue, despite its (stochastically) lower relevance. The
optimal ranking for the SE is when ρ ≈0.75. This revenue-
maximizing value is denoted by ρ∗ (which depends on z),
and we later assume that the SE will apply its LO-ρ∗ ranking
policy.
We now take the perspective of CP 2, and compute its
optimal decision. CP 2 invests in quality z to modify its
relevance distribution to [0, 1 + 20z], anticipating that the
SE is going to rank requests according to ρ∗. To simplify
the example, we assume that an estimate of the distribution
of Y is always immediately available to the SE (in real life
there will be a delay to update the estimate when the distri-
bution changes, which is fine if the distribution changes only
slowly). The profit of CP 2 is the revenue from the search
market, minus the unit investment cost times z. To optimize
z, we simulated the outcomes for z ∈ [0, 0.45]. Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) plot the resulting curves, with a unit cost of quality
Table 1: CTR values used in the simulations, taken from [3]
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0.364 0.125 0.095 0.079 0.061 0.041 0.038 0.035 0.03 0.022
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Figure 1: Average relevance, revenues from the
search market, and number of visits per unit of time
for the case of vertical integration with investment
of 0.7. In both figures, we find that the difference between
neutral and non-neutral revenues is very large for CP1. For
CP2, the difference increases with the investment in qual-
ity, for two reasons: i) CP2 is impacted more frequently by
the non-neutral ranking (being more often the best CP, it
is more often artificially put behind CP1), and ii) CP1 also
benefits from the attractiveness that CP2 creates, hence a
large number of visits, and can afford to be even “less neu-
tral” by increasing ρ∗. As a result, investments made by
CP2 benefit for a very large part to CP1, and a bit to the
other CPs due to the higher overall visit rate. But CP2 is
significantly hurt by non-neutrality; and if it considers its
optimal investment level we have:
• in a neutral regime, CP2 would select z = 0.15, and
obtain a per time unit net revenue of 0.056;
• in a non-neutral regime, CP2 would select z = 0.10
(hence 33% less investment), and obtain a net revenue
of 0.046 (hence a 18% decrease).
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we apply a model of revenue-maximizing
ranking by a SE to compare it with a neutral ranking, based
only on relevance. To investigate the impact of non-neutral
ranking on content innovation, we have considered several
CPs: one integrated by the SE (hence often favored in the
rankings), one investing to improve its quality and revenues,
and other independent ones. Our conclusion is that, as
claimed by neutrality proponents, non-neutrality can sig-
nificantly restrain innovation: for our example, innovation
(investments in quality) are reduced by 33%, and the in-
novating CP makes 18% less than in a neutral regime. Of
course, those conclusions strongly depend on the parameter
values: with other values we have found that the impact of
non-neutrality is not very large. Some deeper econometric
studies would be necessary to find the most appropriate pa-
rameters, and our analysis could then be directly applied on
those data.
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